In this paper, we propose a semi-static secure broadcast encryption scheme with constant-sized private keys and ciphertexts. Our result improves the semi-static secure broadcast encryption scheme introduced by Gentry and Waters. Specifically, we reduce the private key and ciphertext size by half. By applying the generic transformation proposed by Gentry and Waters, our scheme also achieves adaptive security. Finally, we present an improved implementation idea which can reduce the ciphertext size in the aforementioned generic transformation.
Introduction
A broadcast encryption [7] is a cryptographic primitive that allows a sender to encrypt a message to a set of users so that only the users within that set can decrypt it and obtain the message. In addition, the set of receivers is not fixed and an arbitrary set of users can be chosen by the sender at the time of encryption. Broadcast encryption is suggested as being efficient in a system having a large number of group members, and it also has many practical applications such as its use in secure database system, DRM (digital right management) and group communications. In a broadcast encryption system, any subset of users can be included in a broadcast, but decryption of the chiphertexts is only possible for users included in the broadcast using their own private keys.
There are many desirable properties of broadcast encryption. It can be fully collusion resistant, which means that a ciphertext cannot be decrypted even if all users who are not included in the broadcast encryption collude. This is an essential property of a secure broadcast encryption. Having stateless receivers [15] is another desirable property. In a broadcast encryption with stateless receivers, any set of receivers can be included in a broadcast encryption without requiring any update of private keys.
Multi-receiver key encapsulation [22] (mKEM) is a key encapsulation scheme, which allows multiple parties to share a secret key efficiently, and the notion of mKEM has been extended to multi-receiver identity-based key encapsulation [1] [2] (mID-KEM) by combining it with an identity-based encryption [20] .
Identity-based broadcast encryption [5, 19] is a combination of broadcast encryption and identity-based encryption. Although it shares many similar concepts with mID-KEM, an identity-based broadcast encryption focuses more on a broadcast encryption as a generalization of an identity-based encryption. This means that an identity-based encryption is a special case of an identity-based broadcast encryption with a single receiver in the broadcast. In an identitybased broadcast encryption, encryptions and decryptions are based on receivers' identities, in which the recipients in a normal broadcast encryption are usually indexed sequentially from 1 to n. The most important difference between broadcast encryption and identity-based broadcast encryption is the number of users in the system. Identity-based broadcast encryptions are usually designed to support exponentially many users since user identities are merely bit-strings of arbitrary-size and hence, they are unknown during the system setup.
Adaptive security, also known as full security, of a broadcast encryption was introduced by Gentry and Waters [9] . In this security model, an adversary can adaptively select a target set by using public parameters and previously compromised private keys. Static security, as defined by [3] , is a weaker version of adaptive security of a broadcast encryption. In the static security model, an adversary must declare the target set he/she wants to attack before observing public parameters. A Semi-static security model [9] is half-way between a static and an adaptive security model. Similar to the case in a static security model, an adversary is still required to declare a potential target set prior to setting public keys in a semi-static security model. However, the adversary can select any target set to be challenged, provided that the target set is a subset of the previously declared potential target set.
In this paper, we improve the semi-static secure broadcast encryption of Gentry and Waters. As in Gentry and Waters' scheme, our scheme offers semistatic security and is fully collusion-resistant. In addition, receivers are stateless receivers, and the sizes of the public key and the private key do not depend on the total number of users. Our scheme also features very short private keys and ciphertexts and is computationally more efficient than Gentry and Waters' scheme. Based on the transformation technique from [9] , our scheme can achieve adaptive security while maintaining efficiency.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we will review some related work. We will highlight our contributions and compare them to existing schemes in the literature. In Section 3, we will review some definitions and complexity assumptions that will be used throughout the paper. In Section 4, we will first describe semi-static secure broadcast encryption and subsequently revisit the construction by Gentry and Waters. In Section 5, we will present our construction that will improve Gentry and Waters' scheme, together with its security analysis. In Section 6, we will present the transformation of our scheme to achieve adaptive security, following the transformation technique from [9] . We will also present a technique in the implementation of the scheme to remove the linear-sized tag required in the generic transformation. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
Related works
Since the introduction of broadcast encryption as a revocation system [15] , a number of several fully collusion resistant broadcast encryption schemes have been proposed. [6, 10, 11] A fully collusion resistant broadcast encryption scheme which has short ciphertext was proposed by Boneh, Gentry and Waters (BGW) [3] . They introduced a broadcast encryption scheme with a constant size private key and ciphertext in the static security model, then generalized it to achieve O( √ n) size ciphertext. As a compensation for generalization, they reduced the size of the public key from O(n) to O( √ n). A similar achievement in identity-based broadcast encryption scheme was introduced Delerablée [5]. Delerablée's work offers constant size private keys and ciphertexts, and it supports exponentially many identities in the random oracle model. Gentry and Waters [9] considered adaptive security from a different approach. They first introduced semi-static security, in which efficient schemes can be constructed. Then, they presented a generic transformation to achieve adaptive security with only a small impact on the ciphertext size. Specifically, the resulting ciphertext size is doubled and a component, called a 'tag' is added, which has a space complexity of O(|S|) where S is the set of receivers of a broadcast. For a normal broadcast encryption, this tag is of |S|-bit and can be removed in the random oracle model. In addition, they introduced two broadcast encryption schemes that satisfy semi-static security. Both of the schemes have constant sized ciphertext. In contrast, the first scheme has O(n) private key size, while the second scheme has a constant size private key.
A revocation system [15, 16] where only non-revoked users can decrypt ciphertexts is a type of broadcast encryption system and is comparable to semistatic broadcast encryption. Indeed, the selective secure revocation system and semi-static broadcast encryption offer similar functions when the encrypter in the semi-static broadcast encryption only chooses the set of non-revoked users to be included in the broadcast. However, it seems that Gentry and Waters' technique is not applicable to transform selectively secure revocation to offer adaptive security, as noted in [13] .
Although our scheme and [9] can achieve adaptive security in broadcast encryption, it is only adaptive chosen plaintext attack (CPA) secure. Recently, a few adaptively chosen ciphertext attack (CCA) secure schemes were introduced, including the schemes by Malek and Miri [14] and Ren and Gu [18] , which feature constant size ciphertexts and private keys of size O(n). In addition, Phan et al. [17] suggested a broadcast encryption scheme with constant size private key and ciphertext under a non standard assumption.
Our Contributions
Compared with Gentry and Waters' semi-static broadcast encryption scheme with constant size private key and ciphertext (denoted as GW SS throughout this paper ), our construction offers a reduced-size private key and ciphertext. Also, in terms of computation, the number of pairing and exponentiation computations are reduced. While several adaptively secure broadcast encryption schemes have been introduced recently, our semi-static secure scheme is still important because a semi-static secure broadcast encryption scheme can be transformed into an adaptively secure broadcast encryption scheme. We compare the efficiency of our scheme with other broadcast encryption schemes in Table 1 . Our scheme is quite competitive when we consider both efficiency and security. The only scheme offering better efficiency is the broadcast encryption scheme that was suggested by Phan et al. [17] . Unfortunately, this scheme is based on a nonstandard assumption. 
An adaptively secure scheme transformed from semi-static secure schemes b
In the random oracle model
Definitions and Complexity Assumptions

Broadcast Encryption System
For simplicity, the definition of a broadcast encryption system is often replaced by a key encapsulation system. Through a key encapsulation system, multiple receivers participating in a broadcast share a symmetric key for further secure communications. We introduce the definition of a semi-static broadcast encryption system, which is useful to understand our scheme, based on the definition of an adaptively secure broadcast encryption system [9] . It consists of four algorithms, setup (Setup), private key generation (KeyGen), encapsulation (Enc), and decapsulation (Dec) as defined below.
Setup(λ, n, ) takes as input the number of receivers (n) and the maximal size of a broadcast recipient group (≤ n). It outputs a public/master secret key pair P K, M SK .
KeyGen(i, M SK) takes as input an index i ∈ {1, ..., n} and the secret key MSK. It outputs a private key d i .
Enc(S, P K) takes as input a subset S ⊆ {1, ..., n}, a public key P K and a message M to encrypt. If |S| ≤ , it outputs a pair Hdr, K where Hdr is called the header and K ∈ K is a message encryption key.
Dec(S, i, d i , Hdr, P K) takes as input a subset S ⊆ {1, ..., n} an index i ∈ {1, ..., n}, a private key d i for i, a header Hdr, and the public key P K. If |S| ≤ and i ∈ S, then the algorithm outputs the message encryption key K ∈ K.
Correctness Property. For the correctness, the following property must be satisfied.
It should be noted that the definition of a semi-static secure broadcast encryption system above can be easily extended to encrypt messages using the standard key encapsulation mechanism/data encapsulation mechanism (KEM/DEM) transformation [21] [4].
Bilinear Maps
Let p be a large prime number. Let G 1 , G 2 be two groups of order p, and g be a generator of G 1 . e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 is a bilinear map satisfying the following properties:
1. Bilinearity: For all, u, v ∈ G 1 and a, b ∈ Z, e(u a , u b ) = e(u, v) ab . 2. Non-degeneracy: e(g, g) / ∈ 1. 3. Computability: There exists an efficient algorithm to compute e(u, v), ∀u, v ∈ G 1 . . Let G and G T be groups of order p with bilinear map e : G×G → G T , and let g be a gen-
Complexity Assumptions
The problem is to guess b. The specific BDHE Sum instance we use in our security analysis is for m = 4d + 4 − 1 and
Also, we define AdvBDHES A,n, (λ) as the advantage of an algorithm A to solve the decision BDHE Sum problem as defined above.
4 Semi-static Secure Broadcast Encryption
Security Definition
Static secure broadcast encryption is a weaker notion of adaptively secure broadcast encryption. In a static secure broadcast encryption, the adversary must declare the target set he/she wants to attack before Setup, and ask a challenge against exactly the same target set in Challenge. Semi-static secure broadcast encryption is in between static security and adaptive security. In a semi-static secure broadcast encryption, the adversary must also let the challenger know the target set before Setup in the same way that static secure requires, but the adversary makes a challenge for any subsets of the target set which the adversary has declared. We review the definition given in Gentry and Waters [9] , which is a game between the challenger and the adversary. Both the adversary and the challenger are given as input , i.e., the maximal size of a set of receivers S.
Init:
The adversary A first out a set S * ⊆ {1, ..., n} of identities that he/she wants to attack (with |S| ≤ ), and let k = |S|. Setup: The challenger runs Setup(λ, ) to obtain a public key PK. He/she gives A the public key PK. Extract: The adversary A adaptively issues queries q 1 , ..., q n−k , where q i is that the challenger runs KeyGen on ith element of S * c = {1, ..., n} − S * and forwards the resulting private key to the adversary. Challenge: If Extract is over, The challenger runs Encrypt algorithm to obtain (Hdr * , K) = Encrypt(S, PK) where K ∈ K, and anyS ⊆ S * . The challenger set K 0 = K, and K 1 to a random value in K, then randomly selects b ← {0, 1}. The challenger returns (Hdr * , K b ) to A. Guess: Finally, the adversary A outputs a guess b ∈ {0, 1} and wins the game
In the definition above, the indices of users were noted as ID. However, this is only for the generalization of the definition. For a normal broadcast encryption, the values of ID are taken from the set {1, . . . , n} where n is an integer representing the total number of users and is polynomial in the security parameter. Also, we define AdvBr SS A,n, (λ) be the advantage of algorithm A in winning the semi-static security game through at most users that can be included a broadcast if the system has total n users. It should be noted that the maximum number of extraction queries in this case is n − k in the definition above because A cannot make private key queries for users in S * .
Semi-static Secure Broadcast Encryption by Gentry and Waters [9]
Our main contribution is to improve the efficiency of the semi-static secure broadcast encryption from [9] . However, their construction of semi-static secure broadcast encryption was not separately written down because it can be obtained by simplifying adaptively secure identity-based broadcast encryption. For comparison with our algorithm, it is helpful to rewrite their semi-static secure broadcast encryption scheme clearly based on their description and proof. Let GroupGen(λ, n, ) be an algorithm that outputs suitable bilinear group parameters G, G T , e , where G is of order p ≥ n + .
Setup(n, ): Run G, G T , e ← GroupGen(λ, n, ). Set
PK contains a description of G, G T , e , the parameters n and , along with g γ 1 , g γ·α 1 and the set
KeyGen(i, SK): set r i ← Ψ κ (i) and output the private key
Hdr ← C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , C 4 ← ĝ P (α)·t 1 , g γ·t 1 , g t 1 , e(g 1 ,ĝ 2 ) α −1 ·t . Output Hdr, K . Dec(S, i , d i , Hdr, P K): Suppose i ∈ S = {i 1 , ..., i k }. Define P (x) as above.
Let
) · C ri 4 . Correctness. Note that K = K 1 · K 2 , where we gather the terms containing a γ in K 1 , and the other terms in K 2 .
).
We also have that
= e(g 1 ,ĝ 2 ) 0 = 1 as required.
Our Scheme
Our scheme reduces the size of private keys by removing the randomness r i in GW scheme. Below we give an intuition for the reason that we are able to reduce the private key size (which in turn allows reduction in ciphertext size). Roughly speaking, the key structure, (r i , g γ−r i α−i 2 ) for master key (γ, α) and generator g 2 , of the GW scheme is commonly used to handle adaptive private key queries. However, we observe that this capability is not required since the goal is to achieve semi-static security. Based on this observation, we are able to remove the randomness r i in the private key. Additionally, upon successful removal of r i , we are also able to reduce the ciphertext size by half though removing the component (C 3 , C 4 ) which was used to cancel the effect of r i in the private key.
To be more specific, recall that in the security proof of GW scheme, the problem instance given to the simulator contains various power of α in the exponents. That is, g α j for a set of j and a generator g. The simulator chooses a polynomial f (x) of some suitable degree and sets γ = f (α). While the simulator cannot compute the value γ, the public key is computable because it is at the form of g γ = g f (α) . In order to generate a private key for value i, the simulator is required to compute a value related to g γ−r i α−i . This is where r i is needed in GW's proof: for any value i, the simulator can set r i = f (i). Since γ is f (α), this ensures (α − i) is a factor of γ − r i because the latter is equivalent to f (α) − f (i). Note that indeed the simulator is capable of generating private key for any i.
As discussed, our goal is to achieve semi-static security and thus the capability of handling adaptive private key queries is not necessary. Our simple key structure can be proven as follows. Since any query i must come from the seṫ S = {1, . . . , n} \ S * , the simulator in our scheme sets the polynomial f (x) to be divisible by (x − i) for all i ∈Ṡ. That is, f (x) = i∈Ṡ (x + i)f (x) 1 for some random polynomial f (x) that is also chosen by the simulator. The master key γ is then set to be f (α). Since the adversary in the semi-static setting is restricted to query private keys from the setṠ, the simulator can always compute the corresponding private key since γ = f (α) is always divisible by (x + i) for all i ∈Ṡ. As such, we eliminate the need of randomness r i which in turns remove the ciphertext component (C 3 , C 4 ).
Our scheme has identical Setup with GW SS , which means the public key remains the same as GW SS . However, in KeyGen, the random element r i of a private key in GW SS was removed. As a result of the removal, Enc and Dec become simpler. Also, the size of private keys and ciphertexts are reduced by 50% and less computation are required. The detail of the scheme is as follows.
Let GroupGen(λ, n, ) be an algorithm that outputs suitable bilinear group parameters G, G T , e , where G is of order p ≥ n + .
The private key is SK ← (α, γ, g 2 ). KeyGen(i, SK): Output the private key
Output Hdr, K .
Correctness. The correctness of our scheme is shown as follows.
= e(g 1 ,ĝ 2 ) γ·α −1 .
2
It was modified to a semi-static construction to achieve constant size private key and ciphertext. Thus, as a broadcast encryption in the semi-static security model, this construction can be optimized as per our scheme.
Security Analysis
In this section, we shall prove that our scheme remains semi-static secure. where d = n + 2 .
Init A selects S * ⊆ [1, n] and sends S * to B.
Setup B randomly generates a 0 , a 1 , a 2 R ← − Z * p , and implicitly sets k = |S * |. Then, B parses S * as {i 1 , ..., i k } and sets i j ← n + j for j ∈ [k + 1, ] and P (x) = j=1 (x + i j ). Also, let f (x) = i∈[1,n]\S * (x + i) · f (x), and randomly construct f (x) that is a d − n + k degree polynomial not to have common roots with P (x). f (x) is constructed in this way because f (x) has to be divided by (x + i) to generate valid private keys if identity i does not belong to the target set S * .
and
Then, all public keys which are g γ 1 , g γ·α
can be computed from the instance. Then, B send P K to A.
Extract If A makes a private key query against i, B computes Challenge For simplifying the notations, let g 3 = g α −d− 1 = g a1·α 3d+3 , and g 3 = g β 3 . Then, g 3 andĝ 3 are only possible to be computed from the BDHE Sum instance
If A sends a setS ⊆ S * , B computes a polynomial t(x) of degree d + − 1 satisfying
where f (x)| i is the coefficient of x i in function f . t(x) exists due to Lemma 1 of [9] . B now sets the ciphertext values:
It should be noted that if Z = e(g, g)
Guess Finally, A outputs a bit b . B sends b to the challenger.
Almost Perfect Simulation We show that B's simulation is almost perfect from the point of A. Most of our analysis is identical with GW's analysis [9] . In a semi-static security model, the maximum number of extraction queries is limited as n − k because A only queries private keys for receivers not inS.
• PK is uniformly distributed since a 0 , a 1 , a 2 , and α are random.
• Private key is uniformly distributed if f (x) is uniformly distributed. In order to verify the uniformity of f (x), the information leaking to A is formalized as follows.
• In Init, A gets f (−i) = 0 for i ∈ {S * ∪ [n + 1, n + ]}.
• In Setup, From the PK, A gets f (α) = DL g1 (g γ 1 ).
• In Extract, to A, each private key query reveals f (−i) = 0 for i / ∈ S * .
Since at most n−k extraction queries can be made, therefore the information about f (x) to A can be formulated by total n + − k + 1 equations described above even if we consider all non-zero equations. Because degree of f (x) is n + 2 , f (x) can be random and independent. This implies that the private key is also appropriately distributed. • Suppose Z is random, then the statistical difference from uniform distribution is less than 2/p. Let Z = e(g, g) δ+α 4d+4 −1 , then K = e(g, g) δa0a1a2 · K where K is the correct key for Hdr * . When δ = 0, there is only one possible value of K. However, when δ = 0, there are p − 1 equally probable values of K depending on a 0 a 1 a 2 which is non-zero.
Abort There is no additional abortion which gives advantages to A except the cases we mentioned in Almost Perfect Simulation part. for each private key query, and n − k private key queries can be made at most. Also, for computing t(x), the algorithm must calculate at least one column of a (d + − 1) dimension Sylvester matrix. This requires O( (n + )) algorithm with the current knowledge [9] . Therefore, the running time of this simulation is at most about O((n + ) 2 ). 2
Transforming Semi-static Security to Adaptively Security
The adaptive security model [9] is the strongest and most realistic notion in broadcast encryption. An adversary is not required to declare any target set before observing public keys. As such, there is no Init phase. Moreover, the set for a challenge cipertext can be any subsets of the set of identities that has never been queried in the Extract phase.
Transforming Semi-static Security to Adaptive Security
In addition to the semi-static security model, Gentry and Waters also showed how to transform a semi-static secure broadcast encryption scheme to an adaptively secure broadcast algorithm based on the two key technique [12] . In their technique, two keys are assigned for each user, but only one private key is allocated randomly to an individual user to respond extraction queries adaptively.
Since the sender does not know which key each receiver has, the ciphertext must be constructed for both keys. Furthermore, users can also figure out which ciphertext can be decrypted by their private keys through a bit included in their private key. We basically follow GW's approaches to make our semi-static secure broadcast encryption scheme be adaptively secure. In addition to their technique, we suggest an implementation technique to remove a linearly increasing element in GW's transformation. Let S be the set of receivers. The original transformation requires that for all i ∈ S, a bit b i ∈ {0, 1} is also included in the ciphertext. In other words, the ciphertext contains an additional component of |S|-bit.
Let S = {ID 1 , . . . , ID |S| } be the set of receivers. The original transformation requires an additional one bit information for each identity ID i , denoted as b IDi , to be transmitted along the ciphertext. In order to transmit this information, the transformation includes an additional bit-string t of length |S| such that
In the transformation, the i-th receiver ID i ∈ S is associated with a bit t[i]. And therefore, the |S|-bit t is required.
Since decryption requires the knowledge of S, it is possible that in some scenarios, S has to be transmitted along the ciphertext. In this case, we describe an implementation trick that reduces the component t from |S| bits to one bit. As the set S is normally not counted as part of the ciphertext, truly constant size ciphertext can be achieved.
Our Implementation Technique
Based on the observation that transmitting a set S and a sequenceS, such that for any i ∈S, i ∈ S, requires the same space complexity, we are able to replace {b i } with one single bit as follows. Denote i s as the smallest value in S. Let S b0 = {i ∈ S \ {i s }|b i = 0} and S b1 = {i ∈ S \ {i s }|b i = 1}. In other words, S b0 and S b1 are the partition of S \ {i s } based on the bit b i .
We can construct a sequence S separated as seq(S b0 ), i s , seq(S b1 ) where seq(S) represents the random arrangement of elements of a set S to form a sequence (for simplicity, it can be in the normal ascending order). The sequence S separated , together with a bit b is would be sufficient to recover b i for all i. For instance, the receiver first recovers the smallest identity i s from the sequence S separated . For any i in the sequence S separated , b i = 0 if i is before i s and b i = 1 otherwise. The only bit that needs to be transmitted along with the ciphertext is therefore b is . Note that the cost of transmitting the sequence S separated is identical to that of S. We do not claim significant reduction in transmission cost in practice despite the saving in asymptotic complexity is from O(|S|) to O(1). In practice, if the set of receivers is to be transmitted together with the ciphertext, which is possibly true in some cases when S is highly dynamic, the actual saving of our tricks is log(|S|) − 1 bits only. However, if the set S is known to the set of receivers, the trick is not applicable as in those cases, S does not need to be transmitted repeatedly.
Our construction using S separated is as follows. Note that the size of S separated is identical that of S.
Setup(n, ): Run P K , SK ← Setup SS (2n, ). Set s ← {0, 1} n , Set P K ← P K and SK ← (SK , s). Output P K, SK .
KeyGen(i, SK): Run d i ← KeyGen SS (i + n · s i , SK ). Set d i ← d i , s i . Output d i .
Enc(S, P K): Generate a random set of |S| bits: t ← {t i ← {0, 1} : i ∈ S}.
Hdr 0 , k 0 ← Enc SS (S 0 , P K ) S 1 ← {i + n : i ∈ S t0 } ∪ S t1 , Hdr 1 , k 1 ← Enc SS (S 1 , P K ).
Set C 0 ← SymEnc(k 0 , K), C 1 ← SymEnc(k 1 , K), Hdr ← Hdr 0 , C 0 , Hdr 1 , C 1 , b is where b is is the bit for the smallest identity in i s ∈ S. Output Hdr, K . Also, replace S with the sequence S separated ← {seq(S b0 ), i s , seq(S b1 )} where S b0 ← S t0 \ {i s }, S b1 ← S t1 \ {i s }.
Dec(S separated , i, d i , Hdr, P K): Parse d i as d i , s i and Hdr as Hdr 0 , C 0 , Hdr 1 , C 1 , b is . Set S 0 and S 1 . Run k si⊕ti ← Dec SS (S si⊕ti , i, d i , Hdr si⊕ti , P K ).
Run K ← SymDec(k si⊕ti , C si⊕ti ). Output K.
Since we just compress t to S through S seperated , the security analysis remains the same as in the original Gentry and Waters' proof. Our adaptive broadcast encryption, following this generic transformation, compares favourably to the transformation of GW SS since the impact of the transformation on efficiency is linear.
Conclusion
Gentry and Waters [9] introduced the security model and constructions for semistatic broadcast encryption, which can be transformed to an adaptively secure broadcast encryption. Based on their contributions, we introduced a more efficient semi-static broadcast encryption scheme. Our scheme enjoys smaller ciphertexts, shorter private keys and is more efficient in terms of computation cost.
We also showed that an adaptively secure broadcast encryption scheme transformed from our semi-static broadcast encryption scheme is still competitive against other adaptively secure broadcast encryption schemes that have been introduced recently. In addition, we elaborated an implementation technique to add to Gentry and Waters' transformation technique, which removes the linearly increasing part in the ciphertext. By adopting this idea, the resulting adaptively secure broadcast encryption scheme has a constant ciphertext if the underlying semi-static secure broadcast encryption scheme has a constant size ciphertext.
Furthermore, our scheme can be used as an identity-based broadcast encryption, but limited for polynomially many users. Extending our scheme for exponentially many users might be possible following the approach introduced by Delerablée [5] , but it will rely on a random oracle.
